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COURTS-State Substantive Law Applies in Non-Diversity 
Actions When Local Interests Predominate-
United States v. Y azell* 
Respondent and her husband received an authorization for a 
Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loan and were re-
ferred by the SBA Disaster Loan Office to a local counsel employed 
by the SBA to aid them in complying with the terms of the loan. 
After personal negotiations with the counsel, a promissory note was 
signed by the couple on SBA forms specifically tailored to con-
form to the requirements of state law. This contract was then 
submitted to the SBA along with a signed chattel mortgage on the 
Yazell's store fixtures and inventory and a certification by the local 
counsel that all state law requirements necessary to insure enforce-
ability had been met.1 However, under the Texas law of coverture, 
respondent was unable to bind her separate property by contract 
without first having obtained a court decree removing the dis-
ability.2 She had satisfied the statutory requirement with respect to 
the chattel mortgage, attaching a notarized acknowledgment to this 
effect to the transferred security instrument, but had failed to remove 
the disability to negotiate the note. In an action by the United 
States upon the respondent's default in payment of the loan, both 
the federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the state law limiting the respondent's capacity to enter 
binding agreements barred recovery against her on the note.3 On 
appeal to the Supreme Court, held, affirmed, three justices dis-
senting. Absent a sufficient federal interest to the contrary, the 
United States' rights under contracts which contain specific refer-
ence to state law and which are "custom-tailored" through personal 
negotiations to the particular circumstances involved are subject to 
state laws dealing with familial-property rights. 
The Government's contention in the principal case was that 
the substantive law to be applied in determining its rights under 
the note was not state law, but rather "federal common law." This 
contention was based on the decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States,4 where the Court acknowledged that Erie R.R. v. 
• 382 U.S. !141 (1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case). 
1. See principal case at 344-45. 
2. Tex. Acts 1937, ch. 499, § 2. This medieval limitation was subsequently re• 
moved. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. art. 4626 (Supp. 1965). It now exists only in Michigan, 
and there in modified form. MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 557.1-.55 (1948). 
3. Yazell v. United States, 3!14 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1964), 16 BAYLOR L. REv. 412, 1965 
Duu L.J. 386, 50 VA. L. REv. 1236. The District Court decision was not reported. A 
judgment against the husband was not appealed. 
4. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). This case involved the rights of the United States on 
forged federal commercial paper. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 58-60 (1963); 
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 489, 509-15, 
525.35 (1954). 
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Tompkins5 had abolished federal common law for diversity actions, 
but, nonetheless, held that when a case involved the governmental 
exercise of a constitutional function or power, such as the disburse-
ment of its funds, a sufficient "federal interest" exists to justify per-
mitting the federal courts to fashion their o-wn rules to govern the 
relations between the parties-a use of federal common law.6 Sub-
sequently, this federal common law was applied in cases dealing 
with contracts involving such functions or powers, 7 and in tort 
actions in which the government was a plaintiff. 8 
However, Clearfield also indicated that in the absence of a fed-
eral statute or regulation, state law could, in an appropriate situ-
ation, be adopted by a court as the applicable federal common law.0 
But it was not until the decision in United States v. Standard Oil 
Co.10 that the Court established guidelines as to when such adop-
tion should occur. There the Court said that state law was to be 
used when it provided a "fair and convenient mode of disposition" 
and was either "inescapable" or would not result in "substantially 
diversified treatment where uniformity is indicated as more appro-
priate."11 Under these guidelines an increased judicial adoption of 
state law as the federal common law has begun. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has promoted such a tendency by two statements in 
its more recent discussions of the area. In Commissioner v. Stern, 
the Court stated that since federal common law as a separate entity 
had been greatly stifled by its elimination from diversity cases, the 
more flexible state law should be adopted whenever possible,12 and 
in United States v. Brosnan, it noted that when the Government 
entered areas already subject to complex state law, it should be 
prepared to deal within such laws.13 
5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTS §§ 54-57 (1963). 
6. Interim Supreme Court opinions had indicated that federal common law still 
existed for non-diversity actions. D'Oench, Duhume &: Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 
(1942); Roycl Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Deitrick v. Greaney, 
309 U.S. 190 (1940); Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939). How-
ever, Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement in Erie that "there is no federal general com-
mon law," 304 U.S. at 78, had seemingly confused some lower federal courts. Com-
pare Kolker v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 972 (D. Md. 1941), and Byron Jackson Co. 
v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940), with Alameda Co. v. United States, 
124 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1941), and United States v. Brookridge Farms, Inc., 111 F.2d 
461 (10th Cir. 1940). Clearfield clarified this, stating: 
We ••. agree that the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins • • • does not apply to 
this action. The -rights and duties of the United States on commercial papers 
which it issues are governed by federal law rather than local law. 
318 U.S. at 366. 
7. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944). 
8. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). 
9. "In our choice of the applicable federal rule, we have occasionally selected 
state law." 318 U.S. at 367. 
10. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). 
11. Id. at 309. 
12. 357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958). 
13. 363 U.S. 237, 242 (1960). See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), 
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The decision in the principal case to apply state law is sound as 
a natural progression in this trend toward greater adoption, par-
ticularly in light of the factors upon which the Court based its deci-
sion: (1) that there was no federal statute or regulation dictating 
the use of federal law; (2) that the question involved familial rela-
tionships; and (3) that the contract was made with specific reference 
to state law and was personally negotiated between the SBA and 
the Yazells. With respect to the first factor, the existence of a fed-
eral statute or regulation would have made the use of federal law 
mandatory14 and, while the converse of this (that is, the absence 
of federal law would compel the use of state law) does not neces-
sarily follow, the recent Court decisions indicating that state law 
should be used whenever appropriate certainly encourage this re-
sult.11' 
The existence of the second factor-the ip.volvement with fa-
milial-property relationships-would not seem to compel the use 
of state law, for, as the Court noted in Standard Oil,16 the test in 
determining whether to apply a uniform federal law or to adopt state 
law is to balance the relative federal and state interests. Federal 
interests were certainly present in the principal case, for it dealt 
with a government contract and the disbursal of federal funds, both 
of which have been held to be governed by federal law.17 Other 
federal interests included the uniform administration of the disaster 
loan program and, naturally, the repayment of the loan.18 However, 
in the light of previous Court decisions concerning familial-property 
relationships, and the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court 
seems to have properly applied state law. In Fink v. O'Neil, state 
homestead laws prevented the United States from levying on the 
protected property.19 Homestead laws, like the law in question in 
the principal case, were established to protect from the reach of any 
creditor certain familial properties which the state thought were 
essential to the maintenance of proper domestic relations. As more 
recent Court decisions have apparently strengthened this hands-off 
where Mr. Justice Douglas stated that Clearfield had been limited to suits in which the 
Government was a party by Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 35 (1956). The 
Parnell case is of little significance here, however; first, because the Government 
is a party; and second, because the Court in Parnell did not eliminate the possibility 
of using the Clearfield doctrine, it simply failed to find a sufficient federal interest 
involved to require its invocation. 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958) (statute); United States 
v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961) (regulation). 
15. See notes 12 and 13 supra and accompanying text. 
16. See note II supra and accompanying text. 
17. See notes 4 and 7 supra and accompanying text. 
18. These two interests were the ones relied upon by Mr. Justice Black in his 
dissent. See principal case at 359-60. 
19. 106 U.S. 272 (1882). 
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policy toward state treatment of domestic relations,20 it appears that 
more compelling federal interests than those enumerated above 
should be present before such relations are tampered with. The 
government has a strong interest in the repayment of its loans, but 
in the principal case adequate provisions were available to secure 
repayment had the government made the effort to meet the appro-
priate requirements. Also, had Congress felt that in cases like the 
principal case an overriding federal interest did exist, which interest 
should take precedence over the state law, it could have easily pro-
vided that federal law was to be applied in loan situations. Moreover, 
it appears that the most relevant evidence of congressional intent is 
actually to the contrary. Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure permits execution of a judgment only in a manner prescribed 
by state law unless federal law dictates otherwise. Similarly, Rule 64 
requires that remedies calling for seizure of a person or property must 
be consistent with state law, again excepting cases in which a specific 
federal statute is applicable. While it may well be that a contrary de-
cision on the facts of the principal case would not have had any se-
rious effects on Texas property law since the Texas legislature re-
pealed the coverture statute subsequent to the execution of the note 
in question,21 the Court noted that eleven other states still have stat-
utory provisions restricting the capacity of a wife to bind her prop-
erty by contract.22 Certainly, when the government has alternative 
means of securing repayment of loans, as it did in the principal case, 
there would not seem to be any compelling reasons why state prop-
erty law should not apply. 
Although the Court admits the novelty of its reliance on the 
personal negotiation and local law orientation aspects of the loan,23 
these considerations would also seem to justify the Court's deci-
sion to apply state law. The SBA consciously attempted to adapt 
the loan to the requirements of state law and even employed a 
local law :firm to aid respondent and her husband in complying 
with the terms of the loan. Both the SBA Regional Office and the 
local counsel certified that all necessary steps had been taken to 
20. See, e.g., DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1955), holding that state law 
should be used to interpret the word "children" in § 24 of the Copyright Act, and 
Commissioner v. Stem, 357 U.S. 39 (1958), where state law limited a widow's Ii• 
abilities for her husband's tax deficiencies. In Ballentine the Court specifically stated 
that there was no federal law of domestic relations. 351 U.S. at 580. 
21. See note 2 supra. 
22. Principal case at 351 n.23. The eleven states are Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, and North Carolina. 
23. After discussing at length the reference to state law and the personal nego-
tiations, the Court noted: 
None of the prior cases decided by this Court in which the federal interest 
has been held to override state laws resembles this case in those respects • • • • 
382 U.S. at 346. 
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insure the enforceability of the note.24 These factors, both in-
dividually and collectively, strongly indicate: (1) that the SBA must 
have been aware of the state limitation on respondent's ability to 
contract; (2) that the SBA had every intention of dealing within 
the provisions of the state law; and (3) that despite this knowledge 
and intent, the SBA, although it was aware that the respondent had 
removed her disability to negotiate the chattel mortgage, made no 
effort to have her remove the disability to negotiate the loan. To 
allow the SBA to reach this property-property known to be sub-
ject to restrictions of state law, which restrictions the SBA failed 
to have removed-would certainly be unfortunate, for it would 
subject the respondent to obligations and liabilities which she did 
not and could not undertake. 
Despite the soundness of result in the principal case, two aspects 
of the decision seem likely to breed future problems. The first of 
these is that the Court hinted that two courts of appeals cases in-
volving the Federal Housing Administration25 (FHA) are distinguish-
able from the principal case because although FHA transactions 
are made on forms adapted to state law, they are not personally 
negotiated.26 This differentiation is apparently made because the 
FHA merely insures loans made by private financial institutions, 
rather than dealing directly with the borrower as does the SBA. 
However, these cases clearly indicate that personal negotiation is 
still an important aspect of FHA loans, even though the nego-
tiations are between the borrower and the lender and the lender 
and the FHA, rather than directly between the borrower and the 
FHA.27 Indeed, in one case, a modification agreement was nego-
tiated directly between the debtor and the agency.28 Moreover, 
since the Veteran's Administration29 operates in a manner similar 
to that of the FHA,30 this tenuous legalistic distinction could in-
sulate two of the Government's largest lending institutions from 
the scope of the decision in the principal case, and openly invites 
the SBA to adopt a similar "middle-institution" system to avoid 
the pitfalls of state law.31 Such a result would be undesirable, for 
24. See note I supra and accompanying text. For further discussion of these 
factors, see principal case at 344-47. 
25. See National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. ch. 13, 
§§ 1701-50 (1964). 
26. 382 U.S. at 348 n.15. 
27. United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. View 
Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. · 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 
884 (1960). 
28. United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., supra note 27, at 381. 
29. 38 u.s.c. § 1801-25 (1964). 
30. See, e.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961). 
31. The Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-51 
(1964), seems to give the SBA definite authority to operate in this manner if they desire. 
15 U.S.C. § 634(a)(9) states: "[I']he Administrator may accept the services and 
facilities of Federal, State, and local agencies and groups, both public and private." 
364 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65 
the explicit purpose underlying the SBA's power to make disaster 
loans is to insure that the victims of natural catastrophes are given 
the necessary assistance,32 and obviously the faster the loans can be 
made and the less expensive they are to the borrower, the more 
readily this goal will be achieved. If the loans were made through 
private institutions and were merely insured by the SBA, the in-
terest rate would undoubtedly go up, and the multiple negotiation 
among agency, creditor, and debtor would probably substantially 
inhibit the expediency which the Court found so commendable in 
the principal case.33 Hopefully, therefore, the SBA will decline the 
Court's invitation to circumvent the decision in the principal case 
by adopting procedures which are incompatible with the program's 
underlying policy considerations. 
The second problem is created by the Court's explicit refusal 
to clarify its reasons for applying state law-whether state law was 
adopted to give content to the federal common law or whether it 
was applied ex proprio vigore, that is, of its own force in lieu of 
federal common law.34 Clearfield had held that cases involving dis-
bursal of federal funds were to be governed by federal law,35 and 
United States v. Allegheny County had held that all government 
contracts involving the exercise of constitutional functions and 
powers were to be governed by federal law.36 The principal case 
seems to be an obvious retreat from the broad generalizations found 
in these two cases, but in so retreating, the Court has said that state 
law may be applied in some cases, without indicating how to de-
termine when it may be so applied. Thus, as an example, a court 
in a government lease case, looking at the personal negotiation 
and real property aspects of such a case,37 cannot be certain, in light 
of the decision in the principal case, that state law is not to be ap-
plied, even though numerous lower court cases have held that rights 
Also, §§ 636(a) and (b), which empower the SBA to make small business and disaster 
loans respectively, both contain the clause: "[A]nd such loans may be made or ef• 
fected either directly or in cooperation with banks or other lending institutions 
through agreements to participate on an immediate or deferred basis." 
32. See Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 63l(b) (1964). 
33. Principal case at 344. The loan was for $12,000, repayable at $120 per month 
and 3% interest. The authorization for the loan was received within ten days after 
application, and though not specifically indicated, it appears that the entire trans-
action was consummated in two weeks. 
34. Principal case at 357. This is an important doctrinal distinction which has 
at times been confused by lower federal courts. See Mishkin, The Variousness of 
"Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and ;~tate 
Rules for Decisions, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 803 n.25 (1957). 
35. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text. 
36. 322 U.S. 174 (1944). 
37. Rights in real property are normally governed by state law. See United States 
v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 
204 (1946). 
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under government leases are to be governed solely by federal law.38 
If the court decides that state law may be applicable, it now must 
decide whether that law applies of its own force-a possibility which 
the Court in the principal case refused to preclude-or, if it does 
not apply of its own force, whether it should be adopted to give 
content to the federal common law or be rejected in favor of a 
uniform federal standard. On neither of the latter questions did 
the Court in the principal case offer any help. 
For two reasons the better view would be that state law should 
be treated as having been adopted as the appropriate federal com-
mon law. First, adoption clearly gives greater judicial flexibility 
by allowing rejection of state law when it does not provide a "fair 
and convenient mode of disposition."39 Second and more im-
portant, adoption permits the court to recognize the federal in-
terests involved and where necessary to apply federal as opposed to 
state law. For the Court now to refuse to preclude the possibility 
that state law can be applied of its own force in a case involving 
a disbursal of federal funds or a government contract raises the 
question whether the decisions in Clearfield and Allegheny County 
are still good law, for they did not leave any room for the applica-
tion of state law of its own force. Thus, the courts should resist any 
temptation to apply state law ex proprio vigore, so that they may 
continue to work within the framework of authority which gives 
the courts the right to adopt state law as the federal common law in 
appropriate situations and therefore the ability to weigh the compet-
ing federal and state interests.40 
38. United States v. Starks, 239 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1956); American Houses v. 
Scheider, 211 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1954); Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 
872 (3d Cir. 1945); United States v. Morgan, 196 F. Supp. 345 (D. Md. 1961); Sands v. 
United States, 198 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Wash. 1960), afj'd, 295 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1961). 
In all of these cases, federal law was applied under the rationale of Clearfield: "A 
federal court proceeds to such adjudication without obligation to the landlord-tenant 
law of any state or any limitations which a state may impose on its courts • • • ." 
American Houses v. Scheider, supra at 882. 
39. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. 
40. Besides possibly bringing about a re-evaluation of the choice of law pre-
viously made in certain types of cases, such as government leases, see note 38 
supra and accompanying text, the idea of state law applying ex proprio vigore would 
also supersede two general approaches lower federal courts have used in determining 
what state law should be applied. One approach has been that if the source of the 
relationship between the parties was federal, federal law should be applied. United 
States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. 
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1960); United States v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 209 
F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1954). An even more common rationale is that if the United States 
is a party to a contract, federal law must be applied to interpret it. Cargill, Inc. v. 
Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Starks, 239 F.2d 
544 (7th Cir. 1957); United States v. Lemmox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 
1955); Sealbrook Farms, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 206 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1953); 
Ingraham v. Williams, 173 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1959); United States v. United States 
Foreign Corp., 151 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Terminal Warehouse v. United States, 
101 F. Supp. 937 (D.N.J. 1952). 
